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FOREWORD
MICHAEL

H. TONRY*

This comparative criminal justice symposium offers readers of the
MarylandLaw Review an opportunity to learn more about the criminal
process in three industrialized Western European countries-England,
France, and West Germany-and perhaps thereby to gain new insights
into our own institutions and practices. It also provides, in the first
article, an overview of trends in the American criminal justice system,
which informs our comparison.
The symposium contains four articles. The first, by Andrew von
Hirsch, was originally written for a German audience and so reveals
that extra caution and concern for clarity that often results when we try
to describe our own institutions to people of other countries and languages. Von Hirsch's essay traces the development of theoretical and
jurisprudential thinking in the United States about the purposes of the
criminal law and punishment. Modern criminal laws and institutions,
in most states, are premised on a rehabilitative approach to sentencing
and the need to facilitate individualized punishment decisions. Maryland, for example, has an "indeterminate" sentencing system in which
the lengths of prison sentences cannot be known until prisoners are released. Statutes often do no more than declare that sentences not exceed a maximum length, usually far above the sentences generally
imposed or served, thus offering judges little guidance.' Although the
prison sentence announced by the judge imposes some limits, it is typically the parole board that sets release dates. And prison officials, in a
variety of ways, also can influence how long a prisoner remains a pris* Professor of Law, University of Maryland.
I. See Weigend, Sentencing in West Germany, 42 MD. L. REV. 37, 45-46, 47 (Table I
and Table II) (1983).
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oner. 2 All of these discretions-judicial, parole board, correctionalwere designed in part to permit each successive decisionmaker to tailor
punishment to the offender's rehabilitative needs and to make predictions about the extent to which he has been rehabilitated and will desist
from further crime in the community.
Von Hirsch describes the rise and fall of the rehabilitative ideal,
and the development in the 1970's of several alternate rationales for
punishment: a retributive "just deserts" rationale, with which von
Hirsch himself is identified;' an "incapacitative" rationale, often associated with Harvard's James Q. Wilson;4 and a "neopositivist" rationale,
reflected in the writing of Norval Morris5 and in the Sentencing Standards of the American Bar Association, 6 in which retributive considerations play some part in the determination of sentences, but not a
major one.
Von Hirsch's article provides a useful introduction to those that
follow, for it exposes the premises and principles that are presented
when we think seriously about the roles of the criminal law and punishment in a free society. Dilemmas concerning the relations among an
offender's moral culpability, deserved punishments, and crime control
considerations reverberate through the three other essays. Conceptual
and theoretical developments in the United States are paralleled by developments in France, England, and West Germany. The rise and fall
of the rehabilitative ideal in the United States described by von Hirsch
is not unlike the experience of the rehabilitative "social defense" movement in France and its displacement in recent years by a more punitive
ideology. Changing views of the purposes of punishment also have
shaped developments in England and West Germany.
The three essays on Germany, England, and France critically describe the criminal process in those countries. Thomas Weigend, an
American law specialist at the Max-Planck-Institut for International
and Comparative Law in Freiburg, West Germany, discusses the laws,
practices, institutions, and theories that shape prosecution and sanc2. For example, by awarding, denying, or withdrawing good time (time off for good
behavior), or by supporting or opposing prisoner parole applications, prison officials can
significantly affect sentencing length. In addition, prison officials' power to authorize furloughs, participation in work release programs, and placement in local community facilities
can affect a prisoner's stay of incarceration. See Note, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1067, 1083-86,
1091-92 (1980) (describing prison officials' discretion). See generally H. Hoffman, PRISONER'S RIGHTS-TREATMENT OF PRISONERS AND POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES (1976).
3. See VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).
4. See J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975).
5. See N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974).
6. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES
AND PROCEDURES, ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES (2d ed. 1979).
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tioning in that country. David Thomas, of the Institute of Criminology
at Cambridge University, discusses public prosecution, sentencing, and
parole in England and Wales, reviewing also the historical origins of
the modem English system and the range of sentencing choices available to judges. Edward A. Tomlinson, of the University of Marylanm
School of Law, takes a somewhat different approach in his description
of the French system. He examines criminal investigation, public prosecution, and the trial of criminal cases in comparing the relative efficiency and justice of American and French practice.
These three essays demonstrate that countries with which we share
fundamental political, moral, and philosophical values handle the
problems of crime and punishment by means that appear to differ dramatically from our own. For example, plea bargaining, so common a
feature in American criminal courts, is virtually non-existent in Germany and France, and exists in England only as a modest, judiciallyrecognized "guilty plea discount" and a pale analogy known as "fact
bargaining." Additionally, parole release plays a much smaller role in
Europe (England did not establish parole release until 1967) than in the
United States. And constitutional and statutory protections of defendants' rights offer fewer constraints on investigation, public prosecution,
and adjudication.
The manner in which these countries select their criminal justice
officials also differs markedly from that of the United States. Except at
ministerial levels, public prosecution is largely divorced from elective
politics in all three countries. Prosecutors in England are police department employees, national civil servants, or local lawyers engaged on a
case-by-case basis. Also in contrast to the United States, where state
judges tend to be selected in political elections and federal judges are
appointed by the President according to traditions in which partisan
politics play no small role, German and French judges are career civil
servants. And English judges, although selected by officials who are
political appointees, are neither subject to electoral approval nor so
closely examined on political grounds as in the United States.
Whether the different institutions and traditions reduce crime, or
whether they result in a higher or lower level of substantive justice, are
matters of disagreement. Indeed, American commentators in recent
years have debated whether these differences are only surface-deep.
Former Yale Law School Dean Abraham Goldstein and colleagues
have argued that French, Italian, and West German institutions only
appear to permit judicial control of police investigation and to preclude
the exchange of guilty pleas for sentencing leniency. Instead, they argue, the actual operation of the criminal justice systems in those coun-
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tries closely resembles our own practices.7 Professors Lloyd Weinreb
of Harvard Law School and John Langbein of the University of Chicago Law School, on the other hand, have argued that French and
West German institutions deliver justice promptly, efficiently, and at
lower cost than in the United States and at a level of substantive justice
at least as high.8
This foreword, of course, is not the place to resolve these debates.
What is important is that these analyses of the criminal processes of
these three liberal democratic countries are particularly pertinent to our
consideration of the reform efforts and proposals to which the criminal
justice system in America has been subject for at least the last twentyfive years. In the 1950's and 1960's the principal law reform efforts,
inspired by the Model Penal Code, were addressed at modernization
and rationalization of the substantive criminal law. 9 A majority of
American states have adopted new criminal codes in the last two decades and efforts at federal criminal law codification have been under
way since the late 1960's.10 In the 1960's and early 1970's, the focus of
reform efforts shifted to criminal procedure, as expressed by the
Supreme Court's constitutionalization of state criminal procedure"
and the American Law Institute's development of a Model Code of
Pre-Trial Procedure.' 2 In the mid-1970's the focus shifted again, this
time to the institutions of criminal justice-the prosecutor's offices, the
courts, the parole boards-and consisted of various efforts to limit or
eliminate discretionary powers of public officials such as plea bargaining bans or guidelines, sentencing guidelines, mandatory and presumptive sentence laws, parole abolition and guidelines.' 3
Each of the articles in this symposium is relevant to thinking about
modern reform proposals. Edward A. Tomlinson reviews how the
French legal system accomodates the conflicting interests of the state in
solving crimes and in protecting individual rights and liberties, and
concludes that French efficiency may be purchased at too dear a price
7. See Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of JudicialSupervision in Three "Inquisitorial"
Systems: France,Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977).
8. See Langbein & Weinreb, Continental CriminalProcedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87
YALE L.J. 1549 (1978).
9. See MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
10. See Schwartz, Reform of Federal CriminalLaws.- Issues, Tactics, and Prospects, 41
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1 (1977).
11. See Friendly, The Bill ofRights as a Code of CriminalProcedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV.

929 (1965).
12. MODEL PENAL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Proposed Official Draft

1975).
13. For a recent review, see von Hirsch & Hanrahan, Determinate Sentencingin America:
An Overview, 27 Crime & Delinq. 289 (1981).
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in terms of individual rights. Few who read the article will be able to
avoid pondering its relevance to recent efforts to abolish or to modify
the exclusionary rule and similar prophylactic rules designed to give
meaning to American constitutional protections. The articles by Tomlinson and Weigend suggest (as does recent experience in Alaska14) that
modern states can prosecute criminals without resort to plea bargaining
and perforce present the question whether criminal law administration
should be removed from partisan politics and placed in the hands of
professional civil servants. The Thomas and Weigend articles describe
systems in which announced prison sentences are not inflated to anticipate their later reduction by parole boards and pose the question
whether parole boards are a necessary feature in a humane system of
criminal law administration. Thomas's article describes a system of appellate sentence review that is among the most developed in the world
and demonstrates (as does recent experience in Minnesota'") that appellate judges, given encouragement, effectively can review the sentencing decisions of trial judges to determine whether the sentences they
impose are even-handed and reasonably consistent.
Many intriguing questions-and perhaps some answers-about
American procedures are presented by these articles. For example, I
favor retention of the exclusionary rule, the abolition of plea bargaining and parole, the professionalization of public prosecution, and the
establishment of meaningful, non-deferential appellate sentence review. But where I see suggestions in these articles that other countries'
experience supports my reform agenda, others may find cautionary indications. No reader who is interested in systems of criminal law, however, can fail to be stimulated by these articles to think about their
implications for understanding our own institutions.
14. See M. RUBENSTEIN, S. CLARK & T. WHITE, ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING

(1980).
15. Knapp, Impact of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines on Sentencing Practices, 5
HAMLINE

L.

REV.

237 (1982).

